June 27, 2009
Subtle timing
In the past month, a quick succession of events has occurred that could significantly change the U.S. relationship with countries in the Middle East. Notable speeches by U.S. President Barack Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and important elections in Lebanon and Iran all occurred within a span of weeks. To a certain extent, the timing is coincidental, and the events largely unrelated. But they are connected, and the connection could have meaningful long-term consequences in the region.
During his election campaign, Barack Obama pledged to deliver a major speech on U.S. relations with the Islamic world from the capital of a Muslim country within the first 100 days of his administration. Although Obama's June 4 speech in Cairo missed his 100-day target (his April address to the Turkish parliament in Ankara apparently didn't count), it did not underwhelm in scope or ambition. Seeking a “new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world, one based on mutual interest and mutual respect,” Obama stressed points of common interest between the United States and Islam. Although he reiterated his intention to pursue “violent extremism” and his view that the danger posed by al Qaeda is not an “opinion to be debated [but a] fact to be dealt with,” Obama also emphasized that the United States did not seek permanent military bases in Iraq or Afghanistan. He stressed the commonalty of themes such as democracy, women's rights, and economic development, and he sprinkled his speech with references to the Koran. The White House promoted the speech heavily and went to great lengths to ensure its translation and dissemination in languages and technologies widely used in the Muslim world. Reaction to Obama's speech was generally positive, with the main caveat that his conciliatory words needed to be translated into real action.
Just a few days after Obama's speech, on June 7, Lebanon held widely anticipated parliamentary elections. Long seen as a comparatively sophisticated and diverse corner of the Middle East, Lebanon has been wracked intermittently by civil war and outside intervention since the 1980s. The assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005 led to a popular uprising that drove occupying Syrian forces from the country. In 2006, Israel waged a war against Hezbollah, a militant and political organization based in Lebanon that is popular among the country's Shia population and that receives significant support from Iran. Last year, a power-sharing crisis boiled over into open conflict between Hezbollah and the Lebanese government. The June 7 election was seen not only as an important opportunity for the Lebanese to cast their votes, but also as a proxy in a wider contest of popular opinion between Iran (which supported Hezbollah) and the United States (which preferred a coalition led by Rafik Hariri's son, Saad). Hariri's coalition won more seats than the Hezbollah-led coalition, representing at the very least a perceived setback for Iranian and Sryian influence in Lebanese politics.
Among the closest observers of Obama's speech in Cairo was Israel. Concern about the steadfastness of Obama's support for Israel predates even his election, and many Israelis wondered if Obama would sacrifice U.S. support for Israel in his address to the Muslim world. Obama made no such sacrifice, and he reiterated the United States' strong and “unbreakable” bond with Israel. He did, however, express his opposition to Israeli settlements in the West Bank. On June 14, Israel's newly elected prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, delivered his own notable speech, in which he endorsed the creation of a Palestinian state. This was the first public endorsement of its kind for Netanyahu, who had developed a hawkish reputation during his previous stint as prime minister and in his recent election campaign. Netanyahu's endorsement was far from complete, however. It was conditional on the demilitarization of the new Palestinian state and on the recognition of Israel as a Jewish state, with Jerusalem as its capital. These conditions likely will not form the basis of an ultimate settlement. But the statement represented a notable shift in tone, if not necessarily in substance.
Potentially the most significant event in recent weeks is still ongoing. On June 12, Iranians went to the polls to elect a new president. In many ways, Iran lies at the heart of the U.S. relationship with the Middle East. Iran's nuclear program is of constant concern to the United States and its allies, and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has spoken openly of his desire to destroy Israel. Iran supports militant groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah, and it exerts influence in Iraq and Afghanistan. It also possesses significant quantities of oil, and it borders the strategic Straits of Hormuz. Most importantly, Iran has a long history of resentment toward the United States. The 1979 Islamic revolution was partly fueled by anger at the United States' long support of the Shah, and the revolution has served as inspiration for militant Islamic movements around the world. On June 12, Ahmadinejad faced off against an array of opponents, the most significant being Mir Hossein Mousavi, a conservative former prime minister who experienced a tremendous surge of support among reform-minded Iranians. The official tabulation showed Ahmadinejad winning with 63 percent of the vote—a far more lop-sided outcome than had been expected, and one that seemed rigged by the authorities. Since then, Iran has experienced its largest wave of protests since 1979. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran's Supreme Leader, has been resolute in resisting calls for a new election and in upholding Ahmadinejad's declared victory. The outcome of the election and the protests remains uncertain, but one thing is clear: this episode has unequivocally changed the nature of Iranian politics.
Individually, each of these events would have been significant and noteworthy. And to a certain degree, their clustering within a few weeks was the result of chance—the elections in Lebanon and Iran, in particular, were not scheduled to coincide with each other. But the scheduling of speeches is much more flexible than the scheduling of elections. Netanyahu, for example, likely scheduled his speech to follow Obama's. The prime minister had already received pressure from Obama on the question of settlements in the West Bank. It was important for him to address this pressure, and politically, it was useful for him to present a conciliatory front, if only as a negotiating tactic or to throw his rivals off-balance. Before he could do so, however, Netanyahu needed to see what Obama would say in his much-anticipated Cairo speech.
Indeed, it was Obama's speech in Cairo—the first in this sequence of events—that was most amenable to strategic timing. Obama seems well-aware of the symbolic value of his own election, not only in the United States but around the world. In part, this value rests upon the fact that he is not George W. Bush. But it also comes from his unique background, and to the role that his background can play in challenging negative misconceptions of the United States. Obama's campaign pledge to give a major address in a Muslim capital recognized this. Any U.S. president can address a Muslim audience. But only Obama could do so as a president with an international background, a childhood spent in a majority-Muslim country, and a middle name like “Hussein.” Obama likely knew the impact his speech could have in the Middle East, and he surely knew when Lebanon and Iran were holding their elections. Although the administration denies it, the timing of Obama's speech on the eve of these elections may have been very deliberate.
This doesn't mean that Obama's speech in Cairo was responsible for the victory of Hariri's coalition in Lebanon, or for the upheaval and uncertainty following Iran's election. But even if it had no direct effect, Obama's speech may have indirectly helped to preclude a more negative outcome, from the U.S. perspective. The Bush administration was very unpopular in the Middle East, and although Obama's election was a hopeful sign, there was little concrete evidence that his approach would be much different. His speech in Cairo reiterated to voters throughout the Middle East that his administration would a much more willing partner with receptive regimes. In other words, the promises made by reform-minded candidates in Lebanon and Iran would be much more realistic and achievable with President Obama in office. Elections and speeches, however, are only the first steps toward successful policies. Until the situation in Iran stabilizes, it is far too soon to judge Obama's timing.
Foreign Policy Association, 25 June 2009
Posted by Daniel Widome at 02:40 PM to | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
May 29, 2009
Tigers' tail
This month, one of the world's longest and bloodiest wars drew to a close. After a massive months-long offensive, the Sri Lankan military cornered the remaining forces of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) into a small patch of territory in the northeast of the country, and on May 16, Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa declared victory in the 26-year conflict. This was a remarkable and welcome achievement for many reasons. What was particularly notable however, was that the victory seems to contradict much of modern military history. Insurgencies, especially those as resilient and sophisticated as that orchestrated by the LTTE, are not supposed to be resolvable through brute military force alone. Yet in Sri Lanka, this is what seems to have happened. The defeat of the LTTE presents lessons and challenges for the evolving U.S. strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan, and Barack Obama has taken notice.
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, also known as the Tamil Tigers, were founded by Vellupillai Prahhakaran in 1976. From 1983, they waged a separatist war in the north and east of Sri Lanka, claiming to represent the country's ethnic Tamil minority against the majority Sinhalese government in a conflict that ultimately claimed over 80,000 lives. The LTTE was among the most sophisticated militant organizations in the world. For many years, they controlled much of northeastern Sri Lanka and operated as a ruling authority there, providing a full range of governmental services and effectively defending their territory through conventional military means. In addition to the land-based elements common to most insurgencies, the LTTE also had an air force and a navy, known as the “Air Tigers” and “Sea Tigers,” respectively. The LTTE had the dubious distinction of pioneering suicide bombing; their elite “Black Tigers” unit was responsible for the assassination of a former Indian prime minister and a Sri Lankan president. In short, the LTTE was among the most resilient and well-established insurgencies in the world.
Throughout the 26-year conflict, various attempts had been made to mediate between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE. In the late 1980s, India deployed an ill-fated peacekeeping force to the island, and Norway spearheaded a mediation effort early in this decade. These efforts eventually came to naught, and in 2008, the government launched a full-scale offensive against LTTE-held territory in the north of the country. In January of this year, the government intensified its campaign in an effort to deal the LTTE a final blow. As the LTTE retreated into densely populated regions, it made extensive use of civilians as human shields against government attack. But the government largely disregarded this tactic, as well as UN-mediated cease-fires and designated “safe zones” in which civilians could seek refuge. It pursued its offensive aggressively, inflicting severe civilian casualties. By April, the UN estimated that nearly 6,500 civilians had been killed in the offensive and about 14,000 had been injured.
In a sense, the Sri Lankan offensive created the first man-made humanitarian crisis of Barack Obama's presidency. In April, as the LTTE was being squeezed into an ever-smaller plot of territory, Obama expressed his “deep concern” about the situation and called for an immediate cease-fire. He also “call[ed] upon the Government of Sri Lanka to stop shelling the ‘safe zone' and blocking international aid groups and media from accessing those civilians who have managed to escape.” This month, just days before the LTTE's final defeat, Obama prefaced a televised statement on his decision to withhold photographs of detainee abuse—arguably a far more salient issue to a U.S. audience—with further concerns about the situation in Sri Lanka. He specifically “urge[d] the Tamil Tigers to lay down their arms and let civilians go,” and he repeated his calls for government forces to stop indiscriminately shelling civilian areas and to give international aid groups access to civilian refugees. The president's comments were amplified by similar statements from Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and UN Ambassador Susan Rice.
Behind the proclamations, however, was something more remarkable: concrete action. The Obama administration acted to delay a $1.9 billion IMF loan to Sri Lanka due to the humanitarian crisis. According to one U.S. official, “the problem … [was] that the Sri Lankans have refused to engage on the humanitarian crisis as a priority,” and that delaying the loan was “an attempt to get [Sri Lankan] priorities back where they should be.” The administration acknowledged that the loan was only being delayed, not canceled, and that there was no particular expectation that the delay would compel the Sri Lankan government to change its behavior. Even so, the delay of the IMF loan—coupled with the administration's strong, coordinated criticism of the Sri Lankan government—represented a far more robust response to a humanitarian crisis than had been made by previous administrations in similar circumstances. The Clinton administration's tepid response to the 1994 Rwandan genocide, in particular, is known to have shaped the thinking of some Obama advisors; the president himself may have been similarly motivated.
Obama's response, however strong, did not stop the Sri Lankan government's offensive or delay the LTTE's ultimate demise. Humanitarian concerns aside, the conclusive endgame of Sri Lanka's civil war presents unsettling questions for the United States' own ongoing counter-insurgency operations. Recent military history suggests that the best (if not the only) way to defeat an ethnic- or religious-based insurgency is by protecting the civilian population, trying to win the “hearts and minds” of local noncombatants, and utilizing a “light” military footprint. Essentially, the goal is to deprive an insurgency of its base of support. An aggressive military response, on the other hand, plays into the insurgents' plans. It increases local resentment of the dominant power in the region and drives supporters to the insurgent cause. And given the irregular and asymmetrical method of insurgent warfare, blunt military responses rarely achieve their objectives; tanks and bombers cannot kill insurgents hiding in an urban area without putting a much greater number of civilians at risk, which ultimately serves an insurgent's political objectives. The evolution of the U.S. war in Iraq—from the 2003 invasion, to the bloody occupation period of 2004-2006, to the present “surge” strategy spearheaded by General David Petraeus—only reinforces these lessons.
In Sri Lanka, however, the government did not abide by these principles. It used an abundance of brute force to liquidate the LTTE insurgency. Tanks, planes, and artillery were utilized liberally, and little effort went into winning the “hearts and minds” of the local population. Instead of coaxing the LTTE to lay down its arms or persuading civilians to withdraw their support, the Sri Lankan government pummeled the insurgency mercilessly, along with anything or anyone in its immediate proximity. This strategy is not “supposed” to work. Yet it did. As President Obama oversees a large-scale reinvestment in the U.S. war in Afghanistan, the Sri Lankan experience raises some pertinent questions. Do the lessons that have been learned in Iraq and in previous insurgencies still hold? How and why did the Sri Lankan government succeed? Will the blatant humanitarian costs incurred by its approach eventually outweigh the military defeat of the LTTE, either in the short-term or in the long-term?
Although these are important questions, it is clear that each insurgency is different. Counter-insurgency campaigns must be tailored to local conditions and cannot be transposed or grafted from one dissimilar conflict to another. It is entirely possible, if not probable, that the Sri Lankan government's aggressive approach may have planted the seeds for long-term resentment and instability that could temper the short-term success it has just achieved. The endgame of the Sri Lankan civil war certainly has been fraught with irony. The LTTE was a violent organization and the civil war was immensely destructive; the end of both is clearly a good thing. But the Sri Lankan government's final offensive was indiscriminate in its brutality, and it created a genuine humanitarian crisis.
As if to reinforce the irony, the Sri Lankan government has actually credited President Obama with playing a major role in the success of their offensive. “It is undeniable that the LTTE effectively folded shortly after President Barack Obama told the world that the terrorists were holding innocent Tamil civilians as hostages. He was one of the few world leaders to note that fact so forcefully … I believe that the president's statement had a great influence on the LTTE,” noted Jaliya Wickramasuriya, Sri Lanka's ambassador to the United States. If such a sentiment is genuine, Obama faces a new opportunity. He could use his new-found clout with the Sri Lankan government to urge it to relieve the still-ongoing humanitarian crisis and to build the foundation for a sustainable peace.
Foreign Policy Association, 28 May 2009
Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:15 AM to Asia, Trans-geographical | Comments (5) | TrackBack (0)
April 23, 2009
Zero nukes?
Barack Obama's recent trip to Europe and the Middle East was an important moment in his young presidency. Having spent much of his term so far focused on the deteriorating economy and other domestic concerns, Obama's trip to the G-20 summit in London, to a NATO meeting in France and Germany, to an EU meeting in Prague, and finally to Turkey and Iraq was the president's first intensive exposure to foreign policy. By most accounts, he met or exceeded expectations. Most notable, however, was Obama's public address in Prague, in which he declared the U.S. commitment to a “world without U.S. nuclear weapons.” Long after the world forgets about the rest of his European trip, it may be Obama's speech on nuclear weapons that endures.
At first glance, seeking a “world without nuclear weapons” may seem naïve, at best. Clearly, nuclear weapons are immensely destructive tools of state (or potentially, non-state) power. Having less of a destructive thing naturally would seem good. But nuclear weapons cannot simply be “wished” away. The fundamental principles underlying nuclear weapons are widely known, and the technology and expertise to develop nuclear technology has spread extensively over the past 60 years—such knowledge and technology cannot be “un-invented.” In addition, it is possible that nuclear weapons can provide a degree of strategic stability to the international system. Consider, for instance, the fact that no global conflict akin to the World Wars has taken place since nuclear weapons have been developed. Nuclear weapons may have raised the potential cost of war to such a degree that would-be aggressors thought twice about initiating hostilities. Although the Cold War was a period of intensive diplomatic and ideological struggle, the United States and the Soviet Union never engaged in a full-scale military conflict. If neither country had possessed nuclear weapons, the Cold War might have become much hotter.
If Obama's “zero nukes” posture was naïve to some, it was outright dangerous to others. For decades, the United States has negotiated arms reduction treaties with the Soviet Union and Russia. These treaties stipulated that both parties reduced their nuclear arsenals in a pre-determined, synchronized, and verifiable fashion. This was important for several reasons. As with any armament, the relative balance of forces between two rival states has a significant effect on the stability of their relationship. If two states are evenly matched, or if an imbalance in one category of armament is offset by an inverse imbalance in another category, neither state is likely to initiate hostilities with the other. But the consequences of an imbalance in nuclear forces are much greater than those of an imbalance in tanks or planes. If a country felt that the balance of nuclear forces had tilted in its favor, it might become more inclined to launch a first strike. For this reason, the United States and the Soviet Union always tried to reduce their arsenals in sync with each other, so that the relative nuclear balance was maintained even while the number of weapons was cut. As much as Obama may wish to rid the world of nuclear weapons, and as easily as he could cut the U.S. arsenal unilaterally, such an action would be ill advised. An uncoordinated and unilateral disarmament could radically destabilize the international system, and make the United States (and other countries) less safe.
Critics of Obama's Prague declaration, then, have a clear, logical argument. But that does not necessarily mean it is correct. Obama included a hefty dose of realism in his speech. He acknowledged that the objective of zero nuclear weapons “will not be reached quickly—perhaps not in my lifetime.” He also matched his seemingly lofty goal with concrete steps to achieve it. Obama pledged to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in the U.S. national security strategy and to work with Russia on a new round of arms reduction negotiations. He also promised to push for Senate ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which the United States has signed but which a Republican-led Senate refused to ratify in 1999. Obama also advocated a treaty that would end the production of fissile material that could be used in nuclear weapons.
The steps Obama proposed were specific and pragmatic, but on their own, they were nothing new. In his first term as president, George Bush had agreed on disarmament objectives with then-Russian President Vladimir Putin. President Clinton signed the CTBT in the 1990s and the Senate debated the treaty extensively (and in a partisan manner) almost ten years ago. For years, disarmament experts have advocated a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) that would prohibit the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. Beyond the apparent lack of novelty of Obama's proposals, it is unclear if they would make meaningful progress toward achieving his stated goal of a nuclear-free world. It is difficult to envision the United States and Russia reducing their arsenals to zero anytime soon, and a simple ban on nuclear testing would not eliminate the weapons that already exist. A verifiable FMCT would probably limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but like the CTBT, what would it do for the nuclear weapons that already exist?
These critiques may be valid, but they are equally shortsighted. The nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia are far larger than any other state's. Each country possess thousands of warheads, while the arsenals of the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea each number in the hundreds at the very most. For this reason, most of the major nuclear arms reduction treaties have been exclusively between the United States and Russia. But as these two countries reduce their arsenals, they may eventually count their warheads not in the thousands, but in the hundreds. At that point, they will have rough parity with the other nuclear states, and the arms reduction playing field will become more equitable. Instead of being bilateral affairs, arms reduction treaties could include more of the world's nuclear powers, if not all of them. This would make every nuclear warhead in existence eligible for a negotiated elimination.
Even U.S. action on multilateral treaties such as the CTBT and a potential FMCT could be very meaningful. For the past 40 years, the foundation of nuclear disarmament diplomacy has been the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT essentially splits the world into two camps: the Nuclear Weapons States (NWS), which include the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China; and the Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS), which includes everyone else. The treaty formalizes an implicit bargain: if the NNWS pledge not to seek nuclear weapons, the NWS will work towards global disarmament. As Iran and North Korea have pursued nuclear weapons, the great emphasis has been on the nonproliferation provisions of the NPT. Often overlooked, however, are the pledges of the NWS to work toward the disarmament of their nuclear arsenals. If the NWS, including the United States in particular, are seen to be shirking their disarmament obligations under the NPT, the NNWS may become less inclined to cooperate on international nonproliferation efforts. Even worse, they may decide that the NPT represents a hypocritical bargain and abandon the regime altogether. This is all to suggest that U.S. participation in, and leadership of, multilateral nonproliferation diplomacy can have ripple effects beyond the literal power of the treaty itself. By sheer power of example, the United States can nudge the world in the direction of gradual disarmament.
In a general sense, Obama's speech should been seen as much as a political speech as a policy one. By clearly signaling his policy preferences, he removed a great deal of ambiguity about U.S. national intentions. That ambiguity can only be eliminated through the direct, specific policy actions that Obama outlined. Even then, the world may not be free of nuclear weapons, as Obama readily acknowledged. But just because a goal is unattainable does not mean it should not be pursued. Even if the world cannot rid itself of nuclear weapons, surely it would be a better place with fewer of them, especially if the reductions came about in a verifiable, deliberate, and multilateral manner. In this sense, the goal of global disarmament is similar to the goal of “energy independence.” It is exceedingly unlikely that the United States could reduce its energy imports to zero, but if the goal serves as motivation and inspiration to pursue clean energy technologies, conservation, and efficiency, then it is a worthy political tool applied to desirable policy ends. And that, if nothing else, is what Obama's Prague speech may come to represent, long into the future.
Foreign Policy Association, 23 April 2009
Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:38 PM to Europe, Trans-geographical, U. S. Politics | TrackBack (0)
March 27, 2009
Nuclear empathy
In his first months as president, Barack Obama's focus necessarily has been on the rapidly deteriorating economic situation. But while he grapples with unexpected and fast-moving domestic issues, certain timeless international challenges remain, Iran foremost among them. Although the danger posed by Iran's nuclear intentions is real and prone to unexpected developments, the fundamental parameters of the situation have remained the same for several years. Obama, then, faces a choice. He could base his policy on the unchanging, long-term fundamentals of the situation, or he could respond to the rapidly changing, short-term shifts in assessments and expectations. Obama has already hinted at which tack he prefers, but may find himself constrained by forces beyond his control.
George Bush famously included Iran in his “axis of evil” in 2002, and although the country's nuclear ambitions preceded that date, international interest in its nuclear program certainly increased afterward. Iran's long history of antagonism and resentment toward the United States—from the CIA's meddling in its internal politics in the 1950s, to the Islamic Revolution and the hostage crisis in the 1970s, to the country's support of anti-U.S. and anti-Israel terrorist groups from the 1980s to today—mean that its nuclear intentions are certainly to be of great concern to any U.S. president. That Iranian leaders have regularly referred to the United States as “the Great Satan” and spoken hypothetically about the destruction of Israel has not done much to alleviate fears.
Intelligence about the real progress of the Iranian nuclear program, however, is far less certain. Iran clearly has a nuclear program, but it has consistently declared its ambitions to be peaceful in nature and fully within its rights under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In 2007, a U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) declared that Iran had halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003. But the Obama administration has made clear that it suspects Iran is still pursuing nuclear weapons. During his confirmation hearings, CIA Director Leon Panetta said that he had “no question that they are seeking [weapons] capability.” Obama himself has spoken of Iran's “development of a nuclear weapon.” Last month, an inspection report from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) concluded that Iran has acquired a sufficient amount of low-enriched uranium to produce a single, crude bomb. Understandably, this caused a great deal of anxiety, especially among those who have always been skeptical of Iranian intentions. But shocking headlines overwhelmed the nuance of the report. To produce a bomb, Iran would need to process its low-enriched uranium to make highly enriched uranium—something that would take several years and require the eviction of the IAEA inspectors already in place in Iran.
During the election campaign, Obama differentiated himself from his Democratic and Republican rivals by promoting a more open and transparent engagement of potential U.S. rivals. So far, he has largely kept that promise. This month, on the occasion of the Iranian New Year, he recorded a video message that was meant to directly address the Iranian people. In the message, Obama emphasized common traits that Americans and Iranians shared, in an empathetic tone very similar to many of his own campaign themes: “You will be celebrating your New Year in much the same way that we Americans mark our holidays—by gathering with friends and family, exchanging gifts and stories, and looking to the future with a renewed sense of hope.” He also spoke clearly about the approach he planned to pursue, noting that his “administration is now committed to diplomacy that addresses the full range of issues before us, and to pursuing constructive ties among the United States, Iran and the international community.” Perhaps most notably, he expressed the U.S. desire for “the Islamic Republic of Iran to take its rightful place in the community of nations.” This was a remarkable gesture of respect because U.S. presidents traditionally have not formally or publicly acknowledged the Islamic government of Iran or referred to the country by its formal name.
Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, responded to Obama's message in relatively short order. As might be expected, he did not embrace the president's gesture wholeheartedly. “They chant the slogan of change but no change is seen in practice,” Khamenei noted, perhaps mocking Obama's famous campaign theme. He cited specific changes that have yet to be made: “Has your hostility towards the Iranian nation changed? … Have you unblocked Iran's assets [frozen in US banks]? Have you lifted the oppressive sanctions? Have you stopped insulting us and making accusations against our great nation and its leaders? Have you stopped your unconditional support for Israel?” Such rhetoric, however, does not mean Obama's gesture was fruitless. Iran's leaders have their own domestic political concerns; although the United States is popular among many younger Iranians, the conservative, hard-line constituency is still vitally important to the reigning political and clerical establishment. Indeed, Khamenei did not entirely rebuff Obama's message. He noted that Iran has “no prior experience of the new president of the American republic and of the government, and therefore we shall make our judgment based on his actions.” In other words, Iran would respond to U.S. actions, and not just its words. This is an entirely reasonable response, and it is in the nature of diplomacy that “words” almost always precede meaningful “actions.” Obama's message, then, might not have been made in vain.
The United States, however, is not the only country with a serious interest in Iran's nuclear program. Literally and figuratively, Israel is far closer to the core issues surrounding Iran's nuclear program than the United States. It is the only Middle Eastern country that possesses a nuclear arsenal, and although it is clearly intended as a deterrent against attacks, Israel's Muslim neighbors view it in a far more offensive light. Iran's leaders have long spoken explicitly about their desire to destroy Israel, and the country actively supports anti-Israel militant groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Palestinian territories. Whereas the United States may see a nuclear-armed Iran as a nuisance, Israel sees it as an existential threat. The respective thresholds of action for the United States and Israel, therefore, are very different. The Iranian nuclear program may well reach a point at which Israel sees preventative military action as necessary, while the United States perceives more room for diplomacy and sanctions. The conflicting interpretations of the latest IAEA report highlight the risks here: no one can say with any certainty how close Iran is to acquiring a nuclear weapon. And where some might see the potential for diplomacy and negotiation in such uncertainty, others (in Israel, in particular) see a mortal threat.
Obama, then, faces no easy choices. In Iran, he is presented with a country with a long history of antagonism toward the United States that might be close to acquiring weapons of mass destruction. Or, because the intelligence is often so ambiguous, it might not be so close. On top of that, his closest ally in the region threatens to upend his diplomatic initiatives due to very different perceptions of the same threat. He cannot disregard Israeli concerns, but at the same time, there is no scenario under which a preventative military strike against Iran would have a clearly positive outcome. Obama's tack, so far, appears sound. It is a tentative, flexible, but definitive break with the aggressive rhetoric of George Bush. He applied his potent skills of empathy by speaking directly to the Iranian people in a way that may be interpreted as more sincere than the words of his predecessor; if it has not yielded immediate results, it quite possibly has laid the groundwork for future progress. Obama would be well advised to expand his application of empathy beyond the Iranian people and toward the Iranian leadership. Consider their situation: Iran is surrounded by nuclear powers locally (Israel, Pakistan), regionally (India, Russia), and internationally (U.S. forces based in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Persian Gulf). It is a country with a long and proud history that has regularly been squeezed and exploited by outside powers. Essentially, the Iranian regime is insecure. But they are also smart. They witnessed what happened when a U.S. adversary did not possess nuclear weapons (the invasion of Iraq) and what happened when a U.S. adversary did possess such weapons (the acquiescence to the North Korean nuclear program).
If Obama applied his unique skills of empathy in this manner, what might he find? Clearly, fewer nuclear weapons are better than more. But he must define U.S. objectives in a rational manner. Does he seek to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons? Or does he seek to prevent Iran from acquiring the capacity to develop nuclear weapons? These are very different policy thresholds, and each demands a very different technical, diplomatic, and military approach. Obama, then, must not only apply his ample skills of empathy in dealing with Iran's leaders, but also a clear-headed assessment of what the U.S. interest really is, and how best to achieve it. In this sense, Iran is no different than any other foreign policy challenge. But of course, the stakes are much higher, and Obama's margin for error is that much slimmer.
Foreign Policy Association, 26 March 2009
Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:40 AM to Middle East, U. S. Politics | TrackBack (0)
February 26, 2009
Diplomatic celebrity
The first full month of Barack Obama's presidency was dominated by a debate over the economic downturn and by the administration's ultimately successful effort to pass a stimulus bill. But as the new president made his mark on the domestic front, he also began to introduce his administration to the international community. Hillary Clinton went on her first official trip as secretary of state, and her choice of destinations—and her performances there—offer clues as to how the new administration will conduct its foreign policy.
Clinton's inaugural overseas trip took her to Japan, Indonesia, South Korea, and China. The choice of Asia for her first trip is notable. It reflects the emerging view that East Asia is a region of tremendous growth and dynamism, in terms of economics, demographics, and security. There was a time when the most important U.S. allies—and the first destination for a new secretary of state—would be in Europe. Japan and South Korea are strong U.S. allies, and a visit to their capitals represents a useful maintenance of that relationship. Indonesia is the world's largest Muslim-majority country and a burgeoning democracy, not to mention the boyhood home of the new U.S. president. Clinton is wise to take advantage of the President Obama's popularity in Indonesia, and the United States has a clear interest in strengthening that country's relatively young democracy. And China represents perhaps the most important bilateral U.S. relationship today, with the ongoing (and largely false) choice between treating the country as an ally or an adversary dominating many headlines. Any tour of East Asia that did not include China would be unthinkable.
Substantively, Clinton's trip was noteworthy as well. Before departing, Clinton laid out the broad objectives of her trip. She hoped to encourage the resumption of the Six-Party Talks with North Korea and to pursue cooperative efforts on climate change policies, especially with China. She also stressed the particular importance of the State Department's work on one the so-called “three D's” of national security --defense, diplomacy and development. “Too often, development is regarded as peripheral to our larger foreign policy objectives. This will not be the case in the Obama Administration. We will energetically promote development around the world … which we happen to believe will advance our shared security interests,” Clinton said Compared to much of the rest of the world, however, many countries in East Asia did not clamor eagerly for a change in U.S. presidents or policies. President Bush got along well with conservative governments in Japan and Australia, he championed a controversial nuclear agreement with India, and he managed relations with China in a low key but largely effective manner. In terms of policy, then, Clinton was not necessarily offering anything truly groundbreaking.
Stylistically, however, Clinton made a more distinct impression. In Indonesia, she appeared on a popular television talk show called “Awesome” and talked about her favorite bands (she cited the “music of [her] youth,” such as The Beatles and The Rolling Stones). In South Korea, she answered questions from students about how she fell in love with her husband. In China, State Councilor Dai Binggou complimented the Secretary of State on more than just her negotiating skills: “You look younger and more beautiful than you look on TV.” Some of this was to be expected—a new secretary of state, representing a new administration, is bound to get a great deal of attention on her first trip abroad. But the attention that Clinton received went beyond that. It is important to remember that her background is not as a diplomat but as an elected politician. More than that, Clinton endured the singular spotlight that only falls upon those select few who have lived in the White House for eight years. She knows how to draw attention, how to hold attention, and how to use it for her purposes; Clinton is a celebrity.
The skills of a political celebrity can be of tremendous value for a diplomat, who essentially conducts politics on a global scale. Even if Clinton did not promulgate any new policies or craft new diplomatic agendas in Asia, her trip must be considered a success because she was received in the countries she visited as a star. This kind of public diplomacy was in short supply during the Bush administration, and Barack Obama based much of his election campaign on changing the tone that the United States used to portray itself to the world. In this context, his selection of Hillary Clinton as secretary of state—as opposed to someone with a deeper or more specific background in diplomacy—makes a great deal of sense.
Clearly, Hillary Clinton is more than just a political celebrity. But her selection (and, so far, success) as a high profile secretary of state may hint at how the Obama administration as a whole will conduct its foreign policy. Regardless of political ideology, every president has an institutional interest in centralizing power in the White House. Obama is no different. Clinton may be the public face of U.S. diplomacy, and she may have populated the State Department with her chosen staff. But the real policymaking apparatus may actually exist in the National Security Council at the White House, which Obama has filled with aides and advisors for whom he has developed a trusting relationship over the course of his Senate career and his presidential campaign. Alternatively, Obama may have realized long ago that his early months and years as president would be dominated by his domestic agenda and the worsening economic situation. Entrusting foreign policy to a high-profile figure such as Clinton may have been a low-risk way of “outsourcing” a policy realm for which Obama has, at least for the time being, little time or interest.
These theories are not mutually exclusive, nor are they necessarily true. But Obama's appointment of a high profile, former political rival as secretary of state was an unexpected move when it was announced late last year. Although Clinton has performed ably so far, it is important to remember how implausible her appointment seemed just a few short months ago. Despite any inclination to centralize power at the White House, Obama cannot use the State Department simply as a public relations tool. And even if he was primarily interested in domestic policy, he cannot outsource foreign policy to a political celebrity. The likeliest theory, then, is simply that Obama picked the best person for the job, in order to help him fulfill his political agenda. Based on Clinton's first road-trip as the nation's top diplomat, Obama may well have chosen wisely.
Foreign Policy Association, 26 February 2009
Posted by Daniel Widome at 04:05 PM to Asia, U. S. Politics | TrackBack (0)
January 22, 2009
Strip mined
This month's fighting in the Gaza Strip has dashed any hopes—never realistic to begin with—that the Israel/Palestine conflict would prove any less vexing for President Obama than it has for previous U.S. presidents. The fighting has earned condemnation all around, for Hamas (for launching rockets into Israel), for Israel (for the number of civilians its attacks have killed), and for the United States (for the failure of the Bush administration to broker anything remotely resembling progress over the past eight years). During his campaign, Barack Obama promised dramatic change in the foreign policy of the Bush administration,. But as the Gaza conflict has demonstrated, a change of U.S. presidents may not be sufficient on its own to change the prospects for peace in Israel/Palestine.
Allocating blame or determining which party is more “justified” in its actions is nearly impossible in the Israel/Palestine conflict. Each provocation by Israel can be justified by an action by Hamas, which in turn can be justified by Israeli behavior, which is then rooted in something that Hamas has perpetuated, and so on, extending back decades (or even millennia) through history. But if arbitrary lines of causality can be drawn, the proximate source of the latest fighting was the collapse of an Israel-Hamas cease-fire in December 2008. Hamas increased its rocket fire into southern Israel, and Israel responded, first with an aerial and naval assault and later with a ground attack. So far, more than 1,100 Palestinians have been killed in the conflict, one third of whom have been children. Thirteen Israelis have been killed, including three civilians.
Even examining the recent conflict under the arbitrary constraints of the past few months, however, can reveal a deeper and more complex set of motivations. Hamas is a militant and political Palestinian organization that calls explicitly for the destruction of Israel. That it has maintained this stance throughout the Middle East peace process has left it frozen out of most serious negotiations. Hamas' rival party in Palestine, Fatah, was the powerbase for Yasir Arafat for decades. Fatah recognizes Israel's right to exist, and has thus been the main spokesman for the Palestinian cause and is the “preferred” Palestinian political party in Israel and the West. Hamas, however, has a strong following among many Palestinians, if not for its outright resistance to Israel than for the extensive social services it provides in the Palestinian Territories. Fatah, by contrast, is known more for corruption than for effective governance.
In 2006, Hamas won Palestinian parliamentary elections, presenting an unfortunate conundrum for the Bush administration's democracy promotion agenda in the Middle East: is democracy preferable if the “wrong” side wins the election? Meanwhile, Fatah leader Mahmoud Abbas remained president of the Palestinian Authority. Then, in 2007, Fatah and Hamas forces fought for control of Gaza, with Hamas proving victorious and Fatah (and Israel, the United States, and others in the West) becoming embarrassed yet again. Instead of recognizing Hamas' electoral victory and its military successes, Israel attempted to dislodge Hamas from Gaza by imposing a blockade on the territory. Following Israel's unilateral withdrawal from Gaza in 2005, and presuming its continued unwillingness to negotiate with Hamas, a blockade seemed like the only way to place pressure on the organization. But instead of dislodging Hamas, the blockade reinforced its hold on power. Smuggling through tunnels to Egypt maintained its arsenal, while Gazan civilians suffered from a dire shortage of needed supplies.
Israel, for its part, faces the obvious and understandable desire for security. Hamas rocket fire from Gaza—no matter how sporadic or inaccurate—presents a clear threat that no Israeli government could be expected to tolerate indefinitely. But the current Israeli government under Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has other interests that have colored its decision to attack Gaza. In 2006, Olmert presided over an Israeli attack on Hezbollah forces in Lebanon. The parallels to Gaza are striking. Both Hamas and Hezbollah are fiercely anti-Israel and have not participated in the formal peace process. Both organizations use territory immediately adjacent to Israel to launch rockets against Israeli towns—territory that Israel had unilaterally withdrawn from in recent years (Israel ended a decades-long occupation of southern Lebanon in 2000). Both organizations are deeply embedded in the domestic politics of their host territory, and both have wide popular support due to the extensive social services they provide. But in the case of Hezbollah and the Israeli attack in 2006, it was Hezbollah that was deemed the victor. It sustained significant losses, but so did the attacking Israeli forces. More importantly, Olmert and his generals had defined victory as the elimination of Hezbollah as a threat to Israel. That the organization not only survived but more than held its own against the Israeli military served as a great embarrassment for Olmert, and a resounding public relations victory for Hezbollah. In Gaza, Olmert wanted to excise the demons of Lebanon and restore Israel's reputation of military superiority.
Israel also faced domestic political considerations of its own. It will hold elections for the Knesset in February. Olmert, beset with corruption charges, will not be in the running to continue as prime minister. But two of the main candidates to succeed him are members of Olmert's own cabinet, each from different parties of his coalition government. Defense Minister Ehud Barak, of the Labor Party, was Prime Minister when Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon in 2000 and when the Camp David talks with Bill Clinton and Yasir Arafat fell apart. Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, of Olmert's own Kadima Party, is known for her hawkish instincts and also hopes to become prime minister. Many observers detect subtle (or not-so-subtle) efforts by Barak and Livni to use the Gaza conflict as a way to demonstrate their pre-election resolve and to use their positions in Olmert's cabinet to jockey to become his successor.
The timing of the attack also seemed to take U.S. politics into account. Given Hamas' firm control of Gaza and its reliable track record of launching rockets into Israel, Olmert did not need to wait until the collapse of the cease-fire to launch his attack. The operation was clearly planned in advance and did not need require any specific provocation (aside from the existing geopolitical reality) to launch it. Beyond that, Olmert was well aware of the potential backlash in global public opinion that any attack into Gaza would likely provoke. But the only global public opinion that truly matters to Israel is U.S. public opinion. By launching the attack in December, after the U.S. presidential election, Israel avoided the charged political atmosphere of a U.S. campaign season. But by declaring a unilateral cease-fire only days before Barack Obama's inauguration, Israel contained its most controversial actions to the waning days of President' Bush's administration. President Bush is a known quantity in Israel; he would not do anything to limit Israel's freedom of action, much as he did little to shorten Israel's 2006 attacks in Lebanon. And as a lame duck president, there was little Bush could do to stop Israel even if he wanted to. Obama, on the other hand, does not have a long track record with Israel, and given his domestic constituency, he potentially could be less forgiving of aggressive Israeli actions.
More than most U.S. presidents, Barack Obama will find the Israel/Palestine conflict a vexing one. In a domestic political sense, he faced a great deal of skepticism from pro-Israel groups in the United States during his campaign. Part of this was due simply to the fact that he was a Democrat who had opposed the invasion of Iraq during a period of Republican dominance. But it was also partly due to racial reasons, and to the persistent rumor mongering that Obama was Muslim. In a more strictly policy sense, Obama has promised to change the “mindset that led” to war in Iraq, and this change presumably carries over to the Israel/Palestine conflict. It is likely that he is inclined to re-engage in the peace process more aggressively than President Bush, and certainly more deliberately and earlier in his term than his predecessor, who had been critical of Bill Clinton's very “hands-on” role late in his presidency. Prior to his inauguration, Obama remained cagey about how he would address the conflict in Gaza. He stressed the notion that the country only has “one president at a time” and that as president-elect, it was not his place to make foreign policy. To a certain degree, this reply helped to shirk his responsibility.
The ferocity of Israel's strikes in Gaza, however, may force Obama's hand sooner than he might otherwise have liked, and in a direction he may not have intended to go. The U.S.-Israel relationship will always remain exceptionally strong. But many analysts are suggesting that in the wake of Israel's Gaza attacks, the United States must take a much more balanced approach towards Israel. Instead of approaching the peace process as a stalwart and unambiguous ally of Israel, Obama may instead orient the United States as a more neutral broker. In order to be taken seriously in such a position, Obama would have to force concessions from Israel, especially over settlement construction in the West Bank and over the relative “proportionality” of its response to provocations by militant groups such as Hamas. Some might argue that such an approach would backfire, that only with complete and unquestioning U.S. support can Israel feel secure enough to engage in peace talks with its Palestinian neighbors. This, however, has been U.S. policy for the past several decades. It may be time to subtly but significantly reorient this policy, and President Obama may feel compelled to do so earlier than he would have otherwise preferred.
Foreign Policy Association, 22 January 2009
Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:04 PM to Middle East, U. S. Politics | TrackBack (0)
December 29, 2008
Mumbai revelations
As gruesome as they were, last month's terrorist attacks in Mumbai were a bold wake-up call. The ten attackers entered Mumbai by boat, fanned out across the city, and attacked and laid siege to many of its most notable landmarks. Over the span of several days, 171 people were killed. The brazenness of the attacks reminded Indians that terrorism could still strike them, even in their largest city. But it also served as a reminder to the rest of the world of something that should have become obvious: the relatively new threat of state-less Islamic terrorism is inextricably linked to the older, state-based tensions between India and Pakistan.
The animosities between India and Pakistan stretch back to the founding of each country. When the British granted independence to its South Asian colony in 1947, two states were created: Muslim-majority Pakistan and predominantly Hindu India. The partition was a bloody and tumultuous affair, and it sowed the seeds for the tensions between the two countries that continue to this day. Pakistan and India have fought three major wars and numerous minor skirmishes over the past 60 years. The two countries' tit-for-tat nuclear weapons tests in 1998 did nothing to reduce the geopolitical or religious tensions, though it certainly raised the stakes of the rivalry to frightening new levels.
A source of much of much of the tension between India and Pakistan is the disputed territory of Kashmir. Uneasily and artificially divided by a “line of control” for the past 60 years, Kashmir has become a symbol of the tortured and seemingly intractable rivalry between India and Pakistan. In recent decades, one of Pakistan's preferred methods for exerting pressure in Kashmir has been supporting militant groups in the Indian-controlled portion of the territory. Pakistan officially denies supporting such groups, but it is widely suspected that they continue to receive protection (if not outright support) from forces within the Pakistani military, particularly from the powerful Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI). One such group is Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), which was founded in Afghanistan in the early 1990s and maintains connections with the Taliban and al Qaeda. LeT has become notorious, however, as one of the more vicious militant groups operating in Kashmir. Although it denies responsibility for the Mumbai attacks, the sole attacker captured alive after the assault claimed that he was a member of LeT, and other evidence seems to confirm the group's culpability. This has only served to increase tensions between India and Pakistan.
LeT's apparent complicity in the Mumbai attacks has immediate implications for U.S. counter-terrorism policy and for the incoming Obama administration. For one thing, any spike in tensions between nuclear-armed powers is automatically of interest to the United States. Energy, attention, and resources that could be applied elsewhere must be redirected toward this crisis. Ideologically, however, the threat displayed by LeT in Mumbai is not all that different than the threat posed by al Qaeda and its offshoots in the West. In the scope and prioritization of their objectives, the two groups are broadly similar. Each has a near-term, practical objective that drives the bulk of their operational activity. For LeT, this near-term goal is the expulsion of Indian forces from Kashmir, and for al Qaeda, it is the expulsion of U.S. forces Muslim lands.
But each group also has a longer-term objective, based on a more generalized, extremist ideology that serves more as an abstract inspiration than a practical, operational blueprint. In these longer-term goals, LeT and al Qaeda are kindred spirits. LeT hopes to restore Islamic rule across South Asia, and al Qaeda wants to restore the Islamic caliphate over all of the lands it laid claim to hundreds of years ago. Each group draws its long-term inspiration from the same radical font.
Ideology is a tough thing to defeat. In a more practical sense, however, groups such as LeT and al Qaeda can be targeted by military means, and it is in this context that the Mumbai attacks will most directly affect U.S. policy. As tensions rise between India and Pakistan, India will try to send a message by moving more troops to Kashmir and to its border with Pakistan. For its part, Pakistan will seek to defend its borders (and its honor) by reinforcing its forces in Kashmir and along its eastern frontier. Those reinforcements will come from Pakistan's other border, with Afghanistan, where they nominally have been securing restless tribal areas and preventing Taliban and al Qaeda forces from using the region as a base for operations in Afghanistan. So far, however, Pakistan has not been effective in this mission. The situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated greatly over the past year, in large part due to the ease with which Taliban and insurgent forces can move across the Afghanistan-Pakistan border for resupply and repositioning. If the border is porous now, it will become far more dangerous if Pakistan moved troops away from the area to bolster its defenses against India.
In Afghanistan, U.S. and NATO troops are trying to ensure stability and defeat a growing Taliban insurgency. President-elect Obama campaigned on a pledge to end the war in Iraq and bolster the U.S. effort in Afghanistan, where the U.S. mission has long been perceived as more justified and appropriate than the elective invasion of Iraq (for more, see The Water's Edge, July 2008). It was from Afghanistan that Osama bin Laden planned the 9/11 attacks, and it was there that the hijackers were trained. After Afghan mujahideen expelled the Soviet invaders in 1989, the United States abandoned its former allies, leaving a chaotic power vacuum that allowed the Taliban to seize power and granted al Qaeda a safe haven.
If history teaches any lesson about U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, then, it is that the mission should be completed. But with the situation rapidly deteriorating in that country, a military worn-out by years of deployment in Iraq, and a growing economic crisis at home, many commentators and even some Obama supporters are questioning the wisdom of sending more troops to Afghanistan. It is a country with a long reputation for resisting outside invaders, and if Osama bin Laden hasn't been captured yet, he likely won't be caught with a few thousand additional soldiers.
Another school of thought takes a more nuanced position. Afghanistan remains an important country for the United States, and it would be unsafe and unwise to simply leave. At the same time, sending more troops to the country would be insufficient to defeat the insurgency and could, in fact, only make it worse. Instead, the United States must pursue a more wide-ranging strategy, in terms of both methodology (military support as well as economic support) and geography (stabilizing Afghanistan, demanding accountability from Pakistan, and urging restraint from India). Obama seems to be adopting a position along these lines: “We're going to have to make a series of not just military but also diplomatic moves that fully enlist Pakistan as an ally in that region, that lessen tensions between India and Pakistan, and then get everybody focused on rooting out militancy in a terrain, a territory, that is very tough.”
In a very straightforward way, then, the Mumbai attacks will have a direct effect on U.S. counter-terrorism policy. The attacks were launched by a group that has connections with the Taliban and al Qaeda and that is being protected by Pakistan's ISI. This raises tensions between Pakistan and India, distracting the former from its already meager efforts to support the U.S. mission in Afghanistan and tempting the latter to exact revenge on its long-standing rival. The crux of this geopolitical maze is, of course, Pakistan. Directly or indirectly, it fosters violence and instability in both Afghanistan and India, and its fragile democracy is wracked by corruption, economic woe, and competing factions within its own military. If Osama bin Laden is still alive, he is probably in Pakistan. And to make the situation even more unsettling, Pakistan also has nuclear weapons. Instead of an Afghanistan strategy, then, President-elect Obama is likely to think more in terms of a Pakistan strategy, or at the very least a regional one. He is fortunate that members of his own nascent administration have already thought along similar lines. During the Democratic primaries, Obama and Vice President-elect Joe Biden (then a fellow presidential candidate) shared similar views on Pakistan. They supported efforts to increase non-military aid to the country but to tie further military aid to the Pakistan's actual performance in shutting down Taliban safe havens within its borders (for more, see The Water's Edge, November 2007).
As horrific as the Mumbai attacks were, they serve as a potent reminder that South Asia's security challenges are deeply interconnected. Any policy that truly hopes to address them must encompass Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India in a coherent manner and recognize that resolving the deep-seated interstate tensions could help to undermine the region's potent intrastate (and state-less) threats. Already, rumors are swirling that Obama may appoint a high-powered special envoy to focus exclusively on South Asia; Richard Holbrooke, negotiator of the Dayton Accords that ended the war in Bosnia in the 1990s, has been floated as a potential appointee to this post. If these rumors are true, he may find that bringing peace to the Balkans was easy by comparison.
Foreign Policy Association, 28 December 2008
Posted by Daniel Widome at 09:53 PM to Asia, U. S. Politics | TrackBack (0)
